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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

*Communist Deliveries To Cambodia For The VC/NVA
Forces In South Vietnam, December 1966 - April 1969*

Secret

ER IM 70-188
December 1970

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
December 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Communist Deliveries To Cambodia
For The VC/NVA Forces In South Vietnam
December 1966 - April 1969

Introduction

In September 1970 this Agency published ER IM 70-126, *New Evidence On Military Deliveries To Cambodia: December 1966-April 1969*, which presented our preliminary analysis of documentary evidence on the flow of military supplies to VC/NVA forces via the port of Kompong Som (Sihanoukville). Since the publication of IM 70-126, CIA has received and made available to the community more than 12,000 pages of additional documentation providing detailed and highly reliable data on the scope and nature of the Communists' logistic activities carried out through Cambodia to support VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam.

A special task force set up to exploit these documents has completed its validation and analysis of the new evidence, and this memorandum is the first product resulting from that effort. This memorandum presents revisions of the estimates made in IM 70-126 of the volume of military supplies delivered via Sihanoukville from December 1966 to April 1969 as well as new data on some overland deliveries via Laos. In addition, the memorandum presents data on the share of these supplies that the Cambodian Army (FARK) received

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and was coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of National Estimates, and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.

as its "cut" from these deliveries. Finally, the memorandum presents estimates of the delivery of supplies to border areas where they were turned over to the Communists.

Research currently under way on various aspects of the Cambodian supply operation will be published as separate memoranda. These memoranda will deal with such subjects as the organizational arrangements for the supply operations, the relationship of deliveries to requirements and stockpiles, the procurement of non-military supplies, and the financial costs of the Cambodian supply operation.

Background

1. Beginning in early 1966, Cambodia became an active participant in Chinese Communist programs for the provision of supplies to Communist forces operating in southern II, III, and IV Corps in South Vietnam. With the cooperation of the highest officials in government, an extensive logistical supply system was developed to channel a broad range of supplies to Communist base camp areas in Cambodia and food to Communist forces in southern Laos.

2. In its initial form, the system began operating in February 1966 and until December of that year was geared only to the purchase of foodstuffs, principally salt and rice, on the Cambodian market for shipment to Communist forces. A second element of the system was introduced on 9 December 1966 with the influx of 273 tons of Chinese small arms and ammunition overland via Laos to Stung Treng for immediate transshipment to VC/NVA base camps in Cambodia. On 23 December, the Chinese-flag ship *He Ping* arrived at Sihanoukville and discharged 1,567 tons of military cargo. This shipment, the first of ten deliveries, marked the opening of the so-called "Sihanoukville Route." As such it was the cornerstone of what was to become over time an elaborate and sophisticated logistical system.

3. The functioning of the Sihanoukville Route was a model of simplicity and efficiency. Alerted to the imminent arrival of a Chinese ship, Cambodian officials set in motion procedures to ensure the rapid unloading of the vessel. Under FARK supervision, the cargoes were then moved by truck convoy to a storage depot at Kompong Speu for eventual transshipment to Communist forces. Shipments to base camp areas were based on transport plans forwarded to Cambodian authorities by a VC/NVA official stationed in Phnom Penh. These transport plans would be revised periodically to reflect the changing levels of activity supported by each base camp.

Volume of Chinese Deliveries to Sihanoukville

4. Between December 1966 and April 1969, ten Chinese Communist ships delivered about 29,900 tons of cargo to Sihanoukville. As shown in Table 1, 21,600 tons of military supplies and 5,333 tons of non-military supplies were for VC/NVA forces.* Of the remaining 2,960 tons, about 1,679 tons and 459 tons represented the FARK cut of military and non-military supplies, respectively, and 822 tons were legitimate aid deliveries to FARK (see Table 2).** The volume of total cargo excludes an undetermined amount of ordnance that probably was delivered aboard the *You Yi* in July 1969. Reports from other clandestine sources specify that this ship delivered over 400 tons of ammunition for FARK and an equal amount for the VC/NVA. The new data, however, fail to substantiate this information.

* *Non-military supplies include all items of food, medicine, and clothing. Military supplies include all other items and are broken down into ordnance (including explosives, chemicals, bombs, weapons, ammunition, napalm, etc.) and non-ordnance.*

** *The new evidence clearly shows that the Ji Ning on its arrival in Sihanoukville on 23 August 1967 carried only foodstuffs. The arms tonnage attributed to the Ji Ning in IM 70-126 was, in fact, delivered by the You Yi, which arrived in Sihanoukville on 23 October 1967.*

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Table 1
Chinese Communist Deliveries to Sihanoukville for Communist Forces
23 December 1966 - 3 April 1969

	Ship Names										Metric Tons
	He Ping 23 Dec 1966	Hang Zhou 2 Feb 1967	He Ping 19 Mar 1967	Ji Ning 23 Aug 1967	You Yi 23 Oct 1967	You Yi 10 Jan 1968	Wu Xi 18 Mar 1968	Fo Shan 25 Aug 1968	Li Ming 11 Jan 1969	Huang Shi 3 Apr 1969	Total
Military for VC/NVA	1,064	2,102	2,964	0	1,129	2,488	2,406	2,648	3,037	3,762	21,600
Ordnance	1,005	2,102	2,964	0	1,099	2,344	2,350	2,474	2,894	3,689	20,921
Ammunition	983	1,822	2,457	-	733	1,798	1,619	1,830	2,032	3,127	16,401
Weapons	22	152	395	-	225	297	388	440	435	234	2,588
Other	-	128	112	-	141	249	343	204	427	328	1,932
Non-ordnance	59	0	0	0	30	144	56	174	143	73	679
Non-military for VC/NVA	0	0	20	1,238	106	1,015	51	1,397	981	525	5,333
Food	-	-	-	1,238	-	955	-	791	723	408	4,115
Clothing	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	388	-	-	388
Medical	-	-	20	-	106	60	51	218	258	117	830
Total	1,064	2,102	2,984	1,238	1,235	3,503	2,457	4,045	4,018	4,287	26,833

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Table 2
Chinese Communist Deliveries to Sihanoukville: the FARK Cut and Legitimate Aid to FARK
23 December 1966 - 3 April 1969

	Ship Names										Metric Tons
	He Ping 23 Dec 1966	Hang Zhou 2 Feb 1967	He Ping 19 Mar 1967	Ji Ning 23 Aug 1967	You Yi 23 Oct 1967	You Yi 10 Jan 1968	Wu Xi 18 Mar 1968	Fo Shan 25 Aug 1968	Li Ming 11 Jan 1969	Huang Shi 3 Apr 1969	Total
Military Cut for FARK	103	275	231	0	0	244	314	179	324	9	1,679
Ordnance	103	275	231	-	-	244	236	179	314	9	1,591
Ammunition	103	275	111	-	-	217	200	122	294	8	1,330
Weapons	-	-	120	-	-	27	36	31	20	1	235
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	-	-	26
Non-ordnance	0	0	0	0	0	0	78	0	10	0	88
Non-military Cut for FARK	0	0	0	137	0	101	0	141	80	0	459
Food	-	-	-	137	-	101	-	141	80	-	459
Clothing	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Medical	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Military Aid for FARK	400	0	0	0	0	0	422	0	0	0	822
Ammunition	400	-	-	-	-	-	422	-	-	-	822
Total	503	275	231	137	0	345	736	220	404	9	2,960

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Deliveries to the VC/NVA*Military Supplies*

5. Of the 21,600 tons of military supplies delivered for the VC/NVA, 20,921 tons -- nearly 97% -- were ordnance and the remaining 679 tons were non-ordnance. Ordnance deliveries consisted of 16,401 tons of ammunition, 2,588 tons of weapons, and 1,932 tons of mines, flame throwers, TNT, and other explosives and chemicals. Communications and engineering equipment comprised most of the non-ordnance.

6. Annual deliveries of military supplies to Sihanoukville were as follows:

	<u>Metric Tons</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1966 (Dec)	1,064	5
1967	6,195	29
1968	7,542	35
1969 (Jan-Apr)	6,799	31
<i>Total</i>	<i>21,600</i>	<i>100</i>

After the initial delivery in December 1966, the Communists moved rapidly to exploit the Sihanoukville Route. Two more ships arrived at Sihanoukville in February and March 1967, discharging a total of 5,066 tons of military supplies, or about 82% of the year's total. Although deliveries reached their high-water mark in 1968, the peak level occurred in 1969, when two ships delivered nearly 6,800 tons within a three-month period.

Ordnance -- Weapons and Ammunition

7. The tabulations below show annual deliveries of total ordnance, including weapons, ammunition, and other explosives, to Sihanoukville and a separate breakdown on deliveries of arms and ammunition.

Total Ordnance

<u>Year</u>	<u>Metric Tons</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1966	1,005	5
1967	6,165	30
1968	7,168	34
1969	6,583	31
<i>Total</i>	<i>20,921</i>	<i>100</i>

Weapons and Ammunition

<u>Year</u>	<u>Metric Tons</u>		
	<u>Ammunition</u>	<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Total</u>
1966	983	22	1,005
1967	5,012	722	5,784
1968	5,247	1,125	6,372
1969	5,159	669	5,828
<i>Total</i>	<i>16,401</i>	<i>2,588</i>	<i>18,989</i>

There were no marked shifts in the level of total ordnance deliveries during each year of the 1967-69 period. During this period, yearly deliveries of ammunition averaged a little more than 5,100 tons. Weapons deliveries were marked by a sharp upsurge in 1968, probably reflecting anticipated large requirements generated by record levels of infiltration in that year.*

Non-Military Supplies

8. The first shipment of non-military supplies earmarked for the VC/NVA occurred in March 1967 with the delivery of 20 tons of medical supplies on the *He Ping*. Non-military supplies, especially

* For details on the breakdown of weapons and ammunition by type, amount, and tonnage, see ER IM 70-126. Differences that exist between the aggregate data and the breakdowns contained in ER IM 70-126 primarily reflect the fact that the itemizations by type include only principal categories of arms and ammunition and do not include a breakdown of the ordnance delivered on the *He Ping* on 23 December 1966.

vitamin-enriched foods (4,115 tons), were delivered on all subsequent shipments for a total of 5,333 tons. Indeed, such food was the only cargo delivered on the *Ji Ning* on 23 August 1967. Because there is some evidence that these vitamin-enriched foods were used primarily to improve the diet of convalescing sick and wounded soldiers, the very large deliveries on the *Ji Ning* (1,238 tons) and the *You Yi* (955 tons) on 10 January 1968 may have been related to anticipated combat losses during the general offensive in 1968. Surprisingly, no such pattern is evident in deliveries of medical supplies. Of the 830 tons delivered during the period, more than 590 tons were delivered between August 1968 and April 1969.

Volume of Deliveries Overland via Laos

9. In addition to seaborne deliveries via Sihanoukville, ordnance was delivered to Communist forces using an overland route via Laos.* Ordnance moved by truck down Route 110 in Laos to the Tonle Kong River where it was placed on boats and moved south to Stung Treng. At Stung Treng, the ordnance was then loaded on trucks and delivered directly to Communist base camps along the Cambodian border as far south as Snoul and Mimot. Although rice is known to have been shipped to Stung Treng for transit up the Tonle Kong for Communist forces in southern Laos, the documents provide no evidence that this route was used for ordnance shipments to Communist forces in Laos.

10. Deliveries to Cambodia using this overland route totaled about 850 tons. The first such shipment occurred in early December 1966, consisting of 273 tons of Chinese small arms and ammunition. This was the only known overland delivery of Chinese ordnance. There were subsequent deliveries in March and April 1967, consisting of 100 tons and 156 tons, respectively, of Soviet rockets. The last overland shipment shown in the documents was in March 1968, when 320 tons of Soviet rockets were delivered.

* *The new data concern only one aspect of the logistical system in Laos. They do not provide information on those elements of the system that funneled supplies directly into South Vietnam and to the Tri-Border area.*

The FARK Cut

11. FARK received a "cut" of supplies ranging as high as 10% of all Chinese deliveries entering the pipeline either via Sihanoukville or Laos. It is apparent that the cut was not applied across the board to each category of supplies, but rather was selective, probably reflecting FARK's needs balanced against those of the VC/NVA. In instances of conflicting requirements, the VC/NVA would at times ask FARK to postpone taking its cut and make the difference up on future shipments.

12. Procedures for earmarking the FARK cut were relatively simple. When a ship arrived at Sihanoukville, it carried separate sets of transportation and packing lists prepared in China that detailed the contents of the delivery apportioned to each consignee. The consignees were identified by symbols which appeared on the cases. According to a Cambodian officer who was intimately involved in the operation, the cases marked with the symbology "07-X-XXX" were those designated as the FARK cut.



13. A somewhat similar marking pattern -- "7-X-XXX" -- evidently identified legitimate deliveries to FARK under existing Cambodian-Chinese military aid agreements. Although earlier analysis could not delineate the basic differences between these dual marking systems, the new data appear to establish their meaning. In those cases where a ship carried legitimate aid in addition to an amount earmarked as a FARK cut, the contents of each were listed on separate transportation and packing lists. Moreover, analysis of the stowage plan for the *Wu Xi*, which arrived in Sihanoukville on 18 March 1968 with a cargo including 422 tons of legitimate military aid for FARK and 314 tons representing the FARK cut of supplies for the VC/NVA forces, shows that these consignments were stored in separate compartments. This procedure apparently was used to facilitate the transfer of supplies to appropriate storage depots after unloading. Whereas the FARK cut was initially stored at the Kompong Speu depot and subsequently transferred to the Lovek depot, all legitimate aid deliveries moved directly to the Lovek depot.

14. FARK's cut of supplies delivered via Sihanoukville, as shown in Table 2, consisted of 2,138 tons. Of this total, 1,679 tons were military supplies (including 1,330 tons of ammunition and 235 tons of weapons) and 459 tons were non-military supplies consisting entirely of vitamin-enriched foods. This volume of ammunition coupled with the 822 tons of ammunition delivered as legitimate aid on two ships -- the *He Ping* on 23 December 1966 and the *Wu Xi* on 18 March 1968 -- indicates that during the 29-month period, December 1966 - April 1969, FARK received 2,152 tons of the ammunition delivered by Chinese ships to Sihanoukville.

15. FARK's cut of ordnance was restricted to only those items manufactured in China. In the few instances when some North Vietnamese-manufactured ordnance was delivered on Chinese ships to Sihanoukville, the items were specifically excluded from the cut. FARK also received a cut of the one Chinese arms shipment delivered overland via Laos but did not receive a cut of any Soviet ordnance shipped via this route.

16. There is strong evidence that an undetermined portion of the ordnance FARK received as its cut for supporting the supply channel to Communist forces was diverted to the VC/NVA. Prior to the cross-border operations in April 1970, there were continuing reports that the Cambodians were selling ordnance to VC/NVA forces located along the border. Photography of cache captures during the cross-border operations tends to substantiate this fact. It identifies cases of ordnance with the unique 07-X-XXX marking used to identify the FARK cut of shipments coming through the port of Sihanoukville.

Cache Captures of Ordnance With Case Markings
07-X-XXX



Volume of Deliveries to the Border Areas*Ordnance*

17. Of the nearly 21,750 tons of ordnance delivered to Cambodia for the Communists, border deliveries of 18,198 tons have been identified by the new data.

Ordnance deliveries to Cambodia

Via Sihanoukville	20,921
Via Laos	827
<i>Total</i>	<i>21,748</i>

Ordnance deliveries to border areas

From supplies delivered via Sihanoukville	17,646
From supplies delivered via Laos	552
<i>Total</i>	<i>18,198</i>
Residual (21,748 minus 18,198)	3,550
Ordnance remaining at Kompong Speu Depot, March 1970	2,272
Ordnance still unaccounted for	<u>1,278 (6%)</u>

It is relatively certain that the 1,278 tons of ordnance still unaccounted for in border delivery data were, in fact, shipped to final destinations. It is known, for example, that all deliveries via Laos moved immediately to the base camps without going through the warehouse at Kompong Speu. The inventory of 2,272 tons at the Kompong Speu depot at the time of the 18 March coup is not a residual but is shown in documents that detail the number and tonnage of each type of ordnance.

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5 February 1971

SUBJECT : Communist Supply Deliveries to Cambodia for the
Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Forces in South
Vietnam, December 1966-April 1969.

Source Note

1. This memorandum summarizes the information contained in a group of documents captured in May 1970. The information relates to the period 1966 - April 1969. The circumstances of acquisition were such as to establish the authenticity of the material. All numerical figures are approximate, but are believed accurate within 10 per cent.

Introduction.

2. In 1966, Cambodia became an active participant in Chinese Communist programs for the provision of supplies to Communist forces operating in southern Military Region II and in Military Regions III and IV of South Vietnam. Acting with the knowledge and cooperation of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces developed an extensive logistical supply system to channel a broad range of Chinese supplies to Communist base areas in Cambodia.

3. Operations on a significant level began in December 1966 with the delivery of 270 tons of Chinese small arms and ammunition to Viet Cong/North Vietnamese base camps in Cambodia via the overland route through Laos. Shortly thereafter, on 23 December, the Chinese flag ship He Ping arrived at Sihanoukville and discharged nearly 1,600 tons of military cargo. This shipment, the first of at least ten, marked the opening of the so-called "Sihanoukville Route," which immediately became the most important element of an elaborate and sophisticated logistical system.

Chinese Deliveries to Sihanoukville.

4. Between December 1966 and April 1969 at least ten Chinese Communist vessels made deliveries to Sihanoukville for

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

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the Cambodian Viet Cong/North Vietnamese logistical system. These deliveries totaled approximately 30,000 tons of cargo. Some 21,600 tons of military supplies and 5,400 tons of non-military supplies were for Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces.* The remaining 3,000 tons went to the Cambodian army in return for Cambodian government cooperation.

5. Of the 21,600 tons of military supplies delivered for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, 21,000 tons -- approximately 96% -- were ordnance and the remaining 600 tons were non-ordnance. Ordnance deliveries consisted of 16,400 tons of ammunition, 2,600 tons of weapons, and 2,000 tons of mines, flame throwers, TNT, and other explosives and chemicals. Communications and engineering equipment made up most of the non-ordnance.

6. Annual deliveries of military supplies to Sihanoukville were as follows:

	<u>Metric Tons</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
1966 (Dec)	1,800	8
1967	6,100	28
1968	7,500	35
1969 (Jan-Apr)	6,200	29
TOTAL	21,600	100

Overland Deliveries via Laos.

7. In addition to seaborne deliveries via Sihanoukville, ordnance was delivered to Communist base areas in Cambodia via an overland truck route through Laotian territory.** Deliveries by this route totaled approximately 850 tons. The 270 ton shipment of December 1966 was the only recorded overland delivery of

*Non-military supplies include all items of food, medicine and clothing. Military supplies include all other items and are broken down into ordnance (weapons and all kinds of ammunition and explosives) and non-ordnance.

**This report concerns only the Cambodian aspect of the logistical system in Laos and does not deal with shipments of supplies from Laos directly into northern South Vietnam.

Chinese ordnance. Two hundred and fifty tons of Soviet rockets were delivered by the same route in March-April 1967. The final overland shipment noted in the documents was an additional 320 tons of Soviet rockets in March 1968.

The Cambodian Cut

8. The Cambodian armed forces were allotted a "cut" of supplies never ranging higher than 10 per cent of all Chinese deliveries arriving through Sihanoukville and Laos. The cut was not applied across the board to all categories of supplies, but rather was selective, apparently giving the Communist forces' needs of the moment precedence over those of the Cambodian forces. On several occasions the Cambodian army was required to postpone taking its share, making up the difference on future shipments. The documents further contained considerable evidence that a portion of the Cambodian share of ordnance was in fact diverted to the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese by persons dealing with the Communist forces for private gain.

Analyst Comment

9. The information derived from these documents constitutes the most conclusive available evidence of the critical importance of the Sihanoukville supply route to Communist operations in the southern two-thirds of South Vietnam from 1966 onward. It is estimated that the 21,600 tons of military supplies known to have been delivered to Sihanoukville between December 1966 and April 1969 were alone sufficient to sustain all Communist operations in southern Military Region II and Military Regions III and IV of South Vietnam during the period 1967-1969. The Sihanoukville shipments in fact exceeded total estimated expenditures of ordnance in combat plus estimated total losses through capture or destruction. There is no evidence that supply shortages were at any time a limiting factor in Communist operations.

10. Though the group of documents discussed here deals only with deliveries up to April 1969, other evidence indicates that deliveries continued until February 1970, immediately prior to the fall of Prince Sihanouk.

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The Sihanoukville Route

22 Feb 1971

THE SIHANOUKVILLE ROUTE

INTRODUCTION

North Vietnam's offensive activities in South Vietnam have always been overwhelmingly dependent on the provision of personnel and material inputs from outside South Vietnam. Most of the manpower required to sustain its aggression has been provided from North Vietnam's own population. But without the substantial material and financial assistance provided by its Communist allies, Hanoi would have been unable to maintain a credible military threat to the peace and security of South Vietnam.

The traditional channel for moving men and supplies into South Vietnam was through an elaborate logistic system in the Lao Panhandle which the North Vietnamese have maintained for more than a decade. As the war expanded and the North Vietnamese required ever increasing amounts of supplies to carry on with the war, they began to expand their logistic system and to establish alternative logistic routes. This effort culminated in the establishment by late 1966 of a system for moving military supplies from Chinese ports through the port of Sihanoukville to VC/NVA base camps along the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border.

The so-called Sihanoukville route rapidly became a primary route for logistic support of the VC/NVA forces in southern South Vietnam, while the Laos route was used primarily to resupply the forces in the northern half of the country.

One of the results of the Allied incursions into Cambodia was that the United States government was able, through the capture of large amounts of enemy documents and the acquisition of other information, to obtain a detailed appreciation of the magnitude and importance of the Sihanoukville route. This document presents the major findings of our analysis of this evidence.

Development of the Sihanoukville Route

Even prior to the initiation of large-scale deliveries of military supplies to the port of Sihanoukville, the Communist forces made extensive use of Cambodian territory for base areas and sanctuary purposes. In addition it was common practice to purchase small amounts of supplies from Cambodians engaged in smuggling activities.

Over the years the use of Cambodia as a source of supplies, particularly for sorely needed foodstuffs, grew in importance. In early 1966, Cambodia became an active participant in Chinese Communist programs for

the provision of foodstuffs to Communist forces operating in the rice deficit areas of South Vietnam and Southern Laos. By the first quarter of 1970 the Communist forces in these rice deficit areas had received 64,200 tons of rice and over 3,300 tons of salt from the Cambodian market.


After less than a year of operation this arrangement was changed radically and Sihanoukville became a channel for the provision of all types of military supplies. In December 1966 the Chinese-flag ship He Ping arrived at Sihanoukville and discharged 1,060 tons of military cargo. This shipment, the first of at least ten deliveries, marked the opening of the so-called "Sihanoukville route." As such it was the cornerstone of what was to become over time an elaborate and sophisticated logistical system.

Chinese Deliveries to Sihanoukville

Between December 1966 and April 1969, Chinese Communist ships carried about 21,600 tons of military cargo (see Table 1), and about 5,300 tons of non-military supplies to Sihanoukville for delivery to VC/NVA forces. Military deliveries included weapons, ammunition and explosives, radios, and engineering equipment. Non-military supplies included food, medicine, and clothing.

CHINESE COMMUNIST DELIVERIES OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO SIHANOUKVILLE FOR VC/NVA FORCES

In Tons



Military Supplies

After the initial delivery in December 1966 the Communists took full advantage of the Sihanoukville route. Deliveries of military supplies totaled about 6,200 tons in 1967 and more than 7,500 tons in 1968. In 1969, during the first four months alone, about 6,800 tons of military supplies were delivered to Sihanoukville.

The military deliveries consisted of extremely large quantities of weapons and ammunition. Included were 222,000 individual weapons, over 16,000 crew-served weapons, 173 million rounds for rifles and light machineguns, almost 11 million rounds for crew-served weapons, and over one-half million mines and hand grenades. The number of individual weapons delivered (rifles, pistols, and submachineguns) was sufficient to equip on a one-time basis over 600 VC/NVA infantry battalions; the number of crew-served weapons (heavy machineguns, mortars, and so forth) delivered could have equipped slightly over 200 battalions. Tables 1 through 4 provide detailed breakdowns on the ordnance delivered to Sihanoukville.

Non-Military Supplies

The first shipment of non-military supplies earmarked for the VC/NVA occurred in March 1967 with

the delivery of 20 tons of medical supplies on the He Ping. Non-military supplies, especially vitamin-enriched foods, were delivered on all subsequent shipments for a total of 5,300 tons. Indeed, such food was the only cargo delivered on the Ji Ning in August 1967. These vitamin-enriched foods were used primarily to improve the diet of convalescing sick and wounded soldiers. The very large delivery of these foods on the Ji Ning (1,240 tons) as well as on the You Yi (960 tons) in January 1968 undoubtedly reflected Communist preparation for the general offensive during Tet-1968.

Deliveries to Border Areas

Our evidence enabled us to trace the movement of more than 18,000 tons or 85 percent of military deliveries to VC/NVA base camps in Cambodia. These bases were arrayed along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border from Ratanakiri Province in the northeast to Kampot Province in the south.

Deliveries of ordnance to these enemy sanctuaries reached a peak in 1967, when more than 7,700 tons were delivered to Communist base areas. Deliveries remained high in 1968, when almost 6,400 tons were delivered. In the months immediately before the

Allied incursions into Cambodia last spring, 1,600 tons were delivered to the Communist sanctuaries. Details on deliveries to the border areas are given in Table 5.

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CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY DELIVERIES TO VC/NVA FORCES VIA SIHANOUKVILLE, 1966-1970




Table 1

Chinese Communist Deliveries to Sihanoukville for VC/NVA Forces
December 1966 - April 1969

	Ship Names										Tons
	He Ping Dec 1966	Hang Zhou Feb 1967	He Ping Mar 1967	Ji Ning Aug 1967	You Yi Oct 1967	You Yi Jan 1968	Wu Xi Mar 1968	Fo Shan Aug 1968	Li Ming Jan 1969	Huang Shi Apr 1969	Total
Military	1,060	2,100	2,960	0	1,130	2,490	2,410	2,650	3,040	3,760	21,600
Ammunition	980	1,820	2,460	--	730	1,800	1,620	1,830	2,030	3,130	16,400
Weapons	20	150	390	--	230	300	390	440	430	230	2,590
Other	60	130	110	--	170	390	400	370	570	400	2,610
Non-military	0	0	20	1,240	110	1,020	50	1,400	980	520	5,330
Food	--	--	--	1,240	--	960	--	790	720	410	4,120
Clothing	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	390	--	--	390
Medical	--	--	20	--	110	60	50	220	260	120	830
Total	1,060	2,100	2,980	1,240	1,240	3,500	2,460	4,040	4,020	4,290	26,930

Table 2

Deliveries of Weapons and Ammunition
to Sihanoukville for VC/NVA Forces, by Year

<u>Year</u>	<u>Tons</u>	
	<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Ammunition</u>
1966 (December)	20	980
1967	770	5,010
1968	1,130	5,250
1969	670	5,160
Total	<u>2,590</u>	<u>16,400</u>

Table 3

Weapons Delivered to Sihanoukville
for VC/NVA Forces

<u>Individual Weapons</u>	<u>Units</u>
7.62-mm pistol, Type 54	30,900
7.62-mm submachinegun, Type 56	115,000
7.62-mm semiautomatic rifle, Type 56	64,000
7.62-mm light machinegun, Type 53	130
7.62-mm submachinegun, Type 54	2,500
7.62-mm AK submachinegun	100
7.62-mm submachinegun, Type 56 (56-1)	3,000
7.62-mm machinegun, Type 56	5,700
Individual rifles	500
Total	<u>221,830</u>
<u>Crew-served Weapons</u>	
7.62-mm heavy machinegun, Type 57	1,450
12.7-mm AA machinegun, Type 54	600
40-mm rocket launcher, Type 56	9,000
60-mm mortar	1,800
82-mm mortar	1,250
120-mm mortar	120
75-mm recoilless rifle	390
57-mm recoilless rifle	250
107-mm rocket launcher	30
RPG launcher	1,190
Total	<u>16,080</u>

Table 4

Ammunition Delivered to Sihanoukville
for VC/NVA Forces

<u>Individual Rounds</u>	<u>Units</u>
7.62-mm Type 56 incendiary cartridges	7,000,000
7.62-mm pistol, Type 51	9,200,000
7.62-mm rifle, Type 56	39,150,000
7.62-mm machinegun, Type 56	83,360,000
7.62-mm steel core, Type 53	22,450,000
7.9-mm cartridge, rifle	4,000,000
7.62-mm tracer, Type 56	7,750,000
7.62-mm tracer, Type 53	200,000
CKC launcher antitank rounds	24,800
CKC rifle grenades	71,900
Type AT/K44 AT grenade	20,000
Antitank grenades for rifles	30,000
Total	<u>173,300,000</u>
<u>Crew-served Rounds</u>	
RPG 7 ammunition	79,900
40-mm rocket	397,000
107-mm rocket	15,000
60-mm mortar	365,200
82-mm mortar	639,200
12.7-mm, Type 54	8,120,500
85-mm	10,000
120-mm mortar	53,000
57-mm recoilless	60,000
75-mm recoilless	90,000
Rockets (not further identified)	15,000
12.7-mm, Type 54 AA machinegun	400,000
12.7-mm, Type 54 AA machinegun tracer	100,100
14.5-mm	340,100
37-mm	36,000
Total	<u>10,700,000</u>

Table 5
Ordnance Deliveries
to Border Areas, by Province

	Tons				
	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Mondolkiri	20	3,090	850	380	300
Svay Rieng	--	900	2,160	700	100
Kompong Cham	70	1,480	1,120	270	90
Kratie	--	410	1,660	600	260
Ratanakiri	--	980	260	--	--
Kampot	20	440	260	200	240
Prey Veng/ Kandal/Takeo	--	260	--	200	610
Other	--	160	80	--	--
Total	<u>110</u>	<u>7,740</u>	<u>6,390</u>	<u>2,360</u>	<u>1,600</u>

Note: Information on border deliveries is incomplete. For this reason total tonnages delivered above do not exactly agree with tonnages delivered to Sihanoukville.

Military Supplies

After the initial delivery in December 1966 the Communists took full advantage of the Sihanoukville route. Deliveries of military supplies totaled about 6,200 tons in 1967 and more than 7,500 tons in 1968. In 1969, during the first four months alone, about 6,800 tons of military supplies were delivered to Sihanoukville.

The military deliveries consisted of extremely large quantities of weapons and ammunition. Included were 222,000 individual weapons, over 16,000 crew-served weapons, 173 million rounds for rifles and light machineguns, almost 11 million rounds for crew-served weapons, and over one-half million mines and hand grenades. The number of individual weapons delivered (rifles, pistols, and submachineguns) was sufficient to equip on a one-time basis over 600 VC/NVA infantry battalions; the number of crew-served weapons (heavy machineguns, mortars, and so forth) delivered could have equipped slightly over 200 battalions. Tables 1 through 4 provide detailed breakdowns on the ordnance delivered to Sihanoukville.

Non-Military Supplies

The first shipment of non-military supplies earmarked for the VC/NVA occurred in March 1967 with

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MEMORANDUM FOR: D/OCI

Attached is your copy of the
unclassified statement requested by
the White House on military deliveries
via Sihanoukville.

Deputy Director
Economic Research

22(BAFB)71

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MEMORANDUM FOR: ONE, _____

25X1

Attached is your copy of the
unclassified statement requested by
the White House on military deliveries
vai Sihanoukville.

Deputy Director
Economic Research

25X1

22 Feb '71
(DATE)

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDP

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via Sihanoukville.

Deputy Director
Economic Research

~~22 Feb '71~~
(DATE)

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SAVA

1 cy hand carried 22 Feb '71

(DATE)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DDP/

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This is the unclassified version
of the Sihanoukville paper. It
will also have 2 graphics. I
would appreciate your reactions

ASAP

Deputy Director
Economic Research

25X1

(DATE)

19 Feb '71

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ch, DDP/FE

Attached is your copy of the
unclassified statement requested by
the White House on military deliveries
via Sihanoukville.

Deputy Director
Economic Research

~~22 Feb '71~~
(DATE)

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ch DDP/FE,

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Attached is your copy of the
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Deputy Director
Economic Research

25X1

22 Feb '71
(DATE)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

IM 70-126

8 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Rear Admiral F. J. Harlfinger
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
(Intelligence)
United States Navy

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Intelligence Memorandum
ER IM 70-126, September 1970, New
Evidence on Military Deliveries to
Cambodia: December 1966 - April 1969

1. As you know, for some time one of the intelligence community's major concerns has been the question of the logistic effort conducted in and through Cambodia to support Vietnamese Communist activities in South Vietnam. We have long been engaged in an intensive, coordinated operational effort to develop hard information on this important subject. This effort has produced a good deal of significant intelligence and in recent weeks has paid off in spades. Through these integrated operations,

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2. As indicated in its introduction, the attached memorandum presents the results of a preliminary analysis of the new material now available in Washington. We are

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circulating this preliminary analysis, and disseminating the evidence on which it is based at this time because of the importance of the subject. I caution, however, that our field stations are processing and transmitting a large number of additional reports and, literally, several thousand pages of additional documents. The data in the documents and reports not yet received in Washington may differ in material respects from the documents and reports on which our preliminary survey was based. Analysts throughout the community will have a lot to chew on in the weeks ahead and it may take some time before we get the whole story sorted out.

/s/

R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment: a/s *Cy 31*

Identical memos sent to:

General Leonard Chapman, Jr. *Cy 32*
Major General Richard Stewart *Cy 33*
Major General Joseph A. McChristian *Cy 34*
Major General R. Triantafellu *Cy 35*

25X1



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

8 SEP 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Donald V. Bennett
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Intelligence Memorandum
ER IM 70-126, September 1970, New
Evidence on Military Deliveries to
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3. I have asked Mr. Smith and [redacted] to deliver this memorandum directly to you on my behalf and be available to respond to any immediate questions you may have on the topics it covers.

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Richard Helms
Director

Attachment

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

8 September 1970

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Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
(Intelligence)
United States Navy

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R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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Major General Richard Stewart *Cy 33*
Major General Joseph A. McChristian *Cy 34*
Major General R. Triantafellu *Cy 35*

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RETURN TO

Secret

P.V. WALSH

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Corrected
March 1970
to reflect info
enabling allocation
of all but 22 tons
of "mix unknown"
military deliveries.

Intelligence Memorandum

Chinese And Soviet Military Deliveries To Cambodia

Secret

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ER IM 69-177
December 1969

Copy No. 110

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
December 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Chinese And Soviet Military Deliveries
To Cambodia

Introduction

There is a large body of evidence which has found increasing acceptance in parts of the intelligence community that shipments to the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville since October 1966 have been the major, if not the primary, supply route for Communist forces in the II, III, and IV Corps areas of South Vietnam. The validity of this conclusion rests primarily on judgments with respect to Chinese military deliveries* to the port of Sihanoukville and the volume and timing of these deliveries.

This memorandum is a basic reexamination of shipping from China and the USSR to Sihanoukville. Its purpose is to identify and quantify military deliveries to Cambodia insofar as this can be done

* The terms military deliveries and military supplies used in this memorandum include ordnance and non-ordnance items. Ordnance is defined in accordance with Army Regulation 320-5, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, 31 October 1967, to include explosives, chemicals, pyrotechnics, bombs, guns, ammunition, flares, smoke, and napalm. Non-ordnance items include all other military supplies except clothing, foodstuffs, and medicines.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research.

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