





DECLASSIFIED IN PART - ^{LA} 25V1
Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2011/10/31 : 
CIA-RDP85T00875R00160003

DECLASSIFIED IN PART - 
Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2011/10/31 : 
CIA-RDP85T00875R00160003

~~Secret~~



25X1



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Foreign Military Aid To Cambodia

~~Secret~~

ER IM 70-46
April 1970

Copy No. 44

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Foreign Military Aid To Cambodia

Introduction

During the past six years the USSR and Communist China have been the major suppliers of weapons and ammunition to Cambodia, and the Cambodian military forces are now armed predominantly with Communist weapons. In view of the current state of relations between Cambodia and the Communist countries, a cutoff in the supply of Communist ammunition and spare parts seems likely, and intensified hostilities are possible. Cambodia's military aid relations are examined in this memorandum, the strength and equipment of its armed forces are detailed, and an assessment is made of the degree of Cambodian dependence on Communist military supplies. This memorandum does not discuss the flow of military supply through Cambodia for Communist forces in South Vietnam.

Military Aid to Cambodia

1. From 1954 until early 1963, the armed forces of Cambodia were almost exclusively equipped by the United States and trained by the United States and France. During this period the United States supplied \$100 million in military assistance (see Table 1). This assistance involved a

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and was coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Table 1
Free World Military Aid Deliveries
to Cambodia

	Million US \$		
	Total 1954-69	1954-63	1964-69
United States	99.8	99.8	--
France	21.5	2.7	18.8
Belgium	0.6	0.6	--
Netherlands	0.5	--	0.5
Yugoslavia	0.7	--	0.7

variety of ground forces weapons, including light tanks, armored cars, field and antiaircraft artillery, and small arms. Naval deliveries from the United States included two submarine chasers, a support gunboat, and almost 80 landing craft and other naval vessels. Deliveries for the Cambodian air force included jet and prop trainers, transport aircraft, and helicopters. France and Belgium supplied much smaller quantities of aid, totaling only about \$3 million.

2. In 1963, Cambodia began to reorient its arms supply relationships toward Communist suppliers. In April of that year a \$1 million military aid agreement with the USSR was concluded, and in November, following Prince Sihanouk's announcement that he no longer would accept US aid, the US military assistance program in Cambodia was suspended. Sihanouk's request for military assistance from other sources was quickly followed by a Chinese offer in late 1963 of \$500,000 worth of military vehicles and infantry weapons, and the USSR extended an additional \$3 million in aid early in 1964 (see Table 2). Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia also responded with small quantities of aid in 1964, and France stepped up its aid, extending \$10 million in 1964 alone.*

* Czechoslovakia earlier (May 1961) had extended a \$1.3 million economic aid credit to Cambodia for the construction of an ordnance factory. The current production status of this factory is unknown.

- 2 -

SECRET

25X1

25X1

25X1

Table 2

Communist Military Aid Extensions to Cambodia

<u>Date of Agreement</u>	<u>Donor</u>	<u>Value of Agreement (Million US \$)</u>	<u>Types of Equipment Delivered</u>
<i>Total</i>		26.3	
Apr 1963	USSR	1.0	3 MIG-17 jet fighters; one U-MIG-15 jet trainer; 24 AA guns; early warning radar; ammunition
Dec 1963	Communist China	0.5	Military vehicles; infantry weapons
Apr 1964	USSR	3.0	2 MIG-17s; battery of 85mm AAA; field artillery; mortars; recoilless rifles; small arms; ammunition
Apr 1964	Czecho-slovakia	Negl.	Small arms and ammunition
Oct 1964	Communist China	3.6	Equipment for 22,000 ground forces; including AAA, artillery, 18,000 small arms, a weapons repair shop; ammunition

SECRET

- 3 -

SECRET

25X1

Table 2
Communist Military Aid Extensions to Cambodia
(Continued)

25X1

<u>Date of Agreement</u>	<u>Donor</u>	<u>Value of Agreement (Million US \$)</u>	<u>Types of Equipment Delivered</u>
Nov 1965	Communist China	4.0	3 MIG-17s; 4 YAK-18 trainer aircraft; 4 AN-2 light transport aircraft; field artillery and AA guns; 3 small patrol boats; small arms, ammunition, engineering and communications equipment for 10,000 men
May 1966	USSR	2.3	5 MIG-17s, 2 AN-2 light transport aircraft; battery of 100mm AAA
Nov 1966	Communist China	3.1	Ammunition
2d half 1967	Communist China	3.0	Ammunition and support equipment
Feb 1968	USSR	5.8	Field artillery and antiaircraft guns; early warning radar;

SECRET

- 4 -

SECRET

25X1

25X1

Table 2
Communist Military Aid Extensions to Cambodia
(Continued)

<u>Date of Agreement</u>	<u>Donor</u>	<u>Value of Agreement (Million US \$)</u>	<u>Types of Equipment Delivered</u>
			armored personnel carriers; one U-MIG-15; small arms, ammunition, and support equipment
Oct 1969 a/	Communist China	N.A.	6 MIG aircraft; light AA guns; other arms; support equipment
a. No portion of this agreement has been implemented.			

SECRET

- 5 -

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

3. Since early 1963, Soviet and Chinese military aid extensions to Cambodia have totaled more than \$26 million. France has remained the only significant non-Communist supplier, delivering \$19 million in assistance during 1964-69. Almost all of the French aid is believed to have been on a grant basis, and all but \$3 million of the Soviet and Chinese extensions have been grant aid. Deliveries under existing aid agreements with the USSR probably were completed in September 1969. With the exception of an agreement signed with China in October 1969, which has not been implemented, deliveries from China under earlier agreements probably were completed in mid-1969.

4. Soviet assistance -- provided under four agreements with a total value of \$12 million -- has consisted of ten MIG-17 jet fighters, two jet trainers, two light transport aircraft, field and antiaircraft artillery, armored personnel carriers, small arms, ammunition, two BIG BAR radar stations (early warning and ground-control-intercept), and various types of support equipment. Chinese assistance -- valued at approximately \$14 million -- has been made up chiefly of light infantry weapons and ammunition, although Peking also has provided Cambodia with three MIG-17s, four light transports, and four trainers as well as artillery and light antiaircraft guns and three small naval patrol boats. French deliveries of military equipment have included light bombers, transport aircraft, trainers, helicopters, light tanks and armored cars, and small arms and ammunition. About three-fourths of the French equipment was delivered in 1964-65.

Cambodian Armed Forces (FARK)

Ground Forces

5. The Cambodian army has a personnel strength of some 40,000 men. In addition, some 10,000 reservists were asked to return to active duty in March 1970. The army is organized into 55 infantry and commando battalions (with an estimated average strength of 380 men in each unit) and 9 specialized half brigades of various size (see Table 3). In

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Table 3

Organization of the Cambodian Army

Type of Unit	Number of Units	Characteristics
Infantry battalion	55	
Commando battalion		
Artillery half-brigade	1	3 groups
Armored half-brigade	1	1 armored regiment and 1 reconnaissance regiment
Parachute half-brigade	1	2 battalions
Phnom Penh half-brigade	1	3 battalions
Signal half-brigade	1	3 battalions
Transportation half-brigade	1	
Engineer half-brigade	1	6 battalions
Antiaircraft half-brigade	1	2 groups
Royal Guard half-brigade	1	2 battalions

addition to the regular army, there are an estimated 55,000 paramilitary forces -- including 15,000 Provincial Guards, 30,000 Home Guards (part-time volunteers), 6,000 Police, and 5,000 members of the National Youth Movement -- under the control of FARK since April 1969.

6. For several years, Cambodia has been gradually phasing out US weapons held by its regular army units and replacing them with Communist weapons. The re-equipment of infantry and commando battalions probably has been largely accomplished.

sufficient weapons were available in September 1969 for this purpose.* The estimated strength of a standard Cambodian infantry battalion equipped with Communist weapons is shown in Table 5.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030046-8

25X1

25X1

25X1

Page Denied

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030046-8

SECRET

25X1

Table 5

Estimated Equipment Strength
of a Cambodian Infantry Battalion

Type of Equipment	Battalion
7.62mm pistol	40
AK-47 assault rifle	150
SKS carbine	120
Light machineguns	18
12.7mm heavy machinegun	3
Rocket launchers (RPG-2)	7
60mm mortar	2
82mm mortar	3
75mm recoilless rifle	3

7. Large quantities of equipment from the US and other Free World countries -- in many categories in quantities equal to or larger than Communist equipment -- are still carried

Some of this equipment is still used by half-brigades and infantry and commando battalions, but these units have been largely re-equipped with Communist arms. Most US and French weapons apparently were issued to paramilitary forces, but their condition may be poor and some may have been lost or sold. Substantial amounts of Free World weapons and ammunition are still held in warehouses, although their condition is not known.

25X1

25X1

Air Force

8. The Cambodian air force is made up of 1,750 men organized into three wings -- tactical, technical, and command -- and a technical training school. Pilot strength is believed to be about 100 men, but not all are presently active. The equipment inventory of the air force is shown in Table 7.

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030046-8

25X1

25X1

25X1

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

25X1

Table 7
 Cambodian Air Force Inventory
 March 1970

<u>Type of Aircraft</u>	<u>Number on Hand</u>
<u>Fighters/Bombers</u>	
MIG-17	13
A-1H (Skyraider)	11
<u>Transports</u>	
AN-2	6
IL-14	1
C-47	12
<u>Helicopters</u>	
MI-4	1
Alouette II	8
Alouette III	1
<u>Trainers</u>	
U-MIG-15	2
T-28	15
T-37	4
Fouga Magister	4
YAK-18	4
Morane Saulnier 733	10
Horizon GY 80	12
<u>Other Types</u>	14

Navy

9. The Cambodian navy, with 1,400 men, is divided into a coastal command and a river command. Coastal patrols use two US-built PC-type submarine chasers, and river patrols use small patrol boats.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Conclusions

10. The quantities of Communist small arms and heavy weapons available to the regular army are adequate for present force levels. The ammunition available in depots for these weapons totaled some 3,000 metric tons at the end of 1969. At the estimated 1969 rate of expenditure (around 600 tons) this quantity of ammunition would be adequate for several years. Under enlarged, sustained combat conditions, however, ammunition would of course be used up much faster, and certain types of ammunition -- particularly for field artillery and mortars -- could run out very quickly.

11. Cambodian ground forces have only small amounts of Communist-supplied armored equipment that would require a substantial amount of spare parts. The only other ground equipment that would be affected by a cutoff of spares would be the 16 pieces of radar-controlled 85mm and 100mm anti-aircraft artillery. In the air force, however, spares and aircraft ordnance probably are in short supply, and a cutoff in deliveries would quickly reduce the already limited capability of this force.

12. A Communist embargo of military supplies would not prevent an expansion of Cambodian ground forces. Weapons and ammunition of US and French origin are also probably available in sufficient quantities to meet expanded force requirements. For example, more than 30 battalions could be equipped with the US rifles currently held in FARK warehouses, if they are in good condition.

SECRET

25X1